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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

SHANE MARK KARTCHNER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981736-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance, a
third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998) in the Third Judicial
District Court, Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of
the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Where an officer stopped to assist defendant following a
bicycle accident, did the trial court correctly determine that
the officer's requests for defendant's name did not constitute
a seizure?

"This court has previously noted 'no analytical distinction among a trial court's
determinations of when a seizure occurs, of reasonable suspicion, or of voluntary consent

for purposes of the applicable standard of review.'" State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 465 n.3 (Utah App. 1991)), cert.
denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). n[W]hether a particular set of facts gives rise to
reasonable suspicion is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. The legal
standard for reasonable suspicion, however, i s highly fact dependent and the fact patterns
are quite variable.9 The legal standard therefore conveys a measure of discretion to the
trial court in our application of the correctness standard to a given set of facts." State v.
Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40
(Utah 1994) (citations omitted)).
2.

When defendant hesitated to give the officer his name and admitted he
"might" or "may" have an outstanding warrant, was the officer's
detention of defendant pending completion of a warrants check
supported by reasonable suspicion?

The standard of review for determining whether a detention was supported by
reasonable suspicion is set forth under Issue No. 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of possession of a contro'
substance, a thud dilutee feluii) uiidni I ll ill I INIIII 'IIIIIII ft SK ] 1 8(JlUiilil I I11'1' I mini inie
count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class-B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37a-5 (1998) (R. 4-6). He moved to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia (R.
26-31) Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 136-38),
Defendant pled guilty to one coui it of possession ol .i lonliollcil vii'lisLiiiiie 11! ! Ill'» 67)

Ilii In ill

IIIIIII

ni mi if ii »M nil i suspended snitnuT off) 5 w ,ir ini| ii'is* mment, ani ,1 I?

months in jail (stayed pending appeal) to be followed by three years probation (R. 17172). In addition, defendant was ordered to pay an SI.850.00 fine (R. 172).
Defendant filed a timely notice
S - '• • *

n

Officer Michael Ashley was patrolli^e 3900 South in Salt Lake City in the late
afternoon of October 18, 1997 (R. 85-86, 95). As Ashley traveled east toward State
Street in "fairly heavy" traffic, he saw defendant standing in the middle of the right
(a-

*

Ashley turned o n his overhead lights and stopped traffic "so i>iviCiiv^AA«.j **im* . get
run over," and got out of his car to assist defendant (id., R, 97 ] ~ Pendant said that he
had just "wrecked" on his bike (R. 8"H \shley noticed scrapes on defendants cibows,
and asked hii i I if he needed i i lediu

.v
3

•

C;U,-J.

;., ..

d

not (R. 97, 184 at 7).
When defendant refused medical treatment, Ashley asked defendant's name. As
Ashley explained, "I just told him I needed his name so I could do the report" (R. 99, 184
at 9-10). "Anytime I do this [,] any kind of accident of this s o r t . . . I always get the name
so I can do a report so that we're not liable later on . . . down the road" (R. 101). When
defendant declined to give his name, Ashley repeated the request for defendant's name
"two or three times" (R. 184 at 7, 9).
Ashley then asked defendant, "Do you have any warrants?" (R. 184 at 7).
According to Ashley, Defendant responded "I may have one, something to that effect, I
might have one" or " I ' m not sure if I have one'" (R. 101, 184 at 7-8). Defendant then
told Ashley his name (R. 184 at 7). Ashley told defendant to wait while Ashley ran a
warrants check (R. 100-01, 184 at 8).
The warrants check confirmed that defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant (R.
88).l Ashley asked defendant if he had any weapons, and defendant handed over a knife
(id.). Ashley then placed defendant under arrest for the warrant (R. 89). Ashley searched
defendant's backpack incident to the arrest and found three baggies of methamphetamine,
along with a syringe and a glass pipe which Ashley recognized as drug paraphernalia (R.
89-91). Defendant admitted that the drugs and paraphernalia were his, and was

!

The record does not reveal the charges supporting the arrest warrant.
4

criminally charged with their possession (R. 5-6, 91).
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia, the
m1l in lai 1 (Iitu w ua a ildi/ntmii, 1mm CUT

i.-.u. J ourt stated I .1 n ) Hiding a detention

did nnl nrnir iinhil nifl MIIIT tilt1 dHniditiil Iml in ulr (dm statrninil nhoul

limited if wis

the possibility of an outstanding warrant"' (R. 184 at 20', Addendum A). The court
concluded that "[b]ased on the defendant's refusal to give the Deputy his name, coupled
\s iUi Lite dciciiddiii > auiiii^^i^n 'mat tic piouaDi> u^

.*i.-,i^.,Jing arrest warrants, the

existence of warrants" (R. 138, Addendum B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant anrues uuxi he was unlr
c|u

i

i

p;

/to

"jrJ - ^ -'.'*r(:c t.> defendant following a bicycle aeuJcin. As the officer explained to
defendant and later testified, he requested defendant's name in order to complete his
accident report.. No physical, force or show of authority were employed that would have
Hi il1 mi i i:jsoii»ib!e pci iiui In IK.lit \ c lit *,\as hung nit laiiiii ill m u s inni(idII I in i

ill In

Identity, I Jnder the circumstances, no seizure occurred.
Defendant next argues that he was unlawfully detained when, after defendant
indicated that he "might" have an outstanding warrant, the officer told him, to wait while
the officer deiennii.wu uwicnuani s warrants' slulus, Dcleiulunl 's uu \ ilhngncss In gn v Ins
5

name, coupled with his admission to the officer that he "might" or "may" have an
outstanding warrant created a reasonable suspicion that defendant was subject to arrest.
Because it was based on reasonable suspicion, defendant's brief detention during the
warrants check did not offend the Fourth Amendment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT UNREASONABLY DETAINED SIMPLY
BECAUSE OFFICER ASHLEY ASKED HIM HIS NAME
FOR ACCIDENT REPORTING PURPOSES
Defendant does not question the fact that when Deputy Ashley stopped his patrol
car, turned on his overhead lights, approached defendant and inquired about his need for
medical assistance, the officer was acting appropriately in his role as a community
caretaker. Appellant's Brief at 11. Defendant acknowledges that the officer's actions
were justified at their inception. Id. However, he maintains that when the officer asked
defendant's name, he detained defendant, and such detention amounted to a unlawful
seizure unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Appellant's Brief at 10, 12-14.
A.
The Officer's Requests for Defendant's Name Did Not Constitute a
"Seizure" Because a Reasonable Person Would Not Have Considered
Himself Detained Under the Circumstances,
"Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is a seizure." Florida
v. Bostick. 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). MA person is seized under the Fourth Amendment
when, considering the totality of the circumstances, the police conduct would have

communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officer's
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or her business." State v,
Higgins. stw

t. ,*.*«;,./ i, viiaLuu^n

e
* a

individual." State v Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991) (citing ^ , w v. Truiillo.
7

39P.2d85 5 87(Utah App: i - 7 )
"Generally, a seizure does not occur where an officer simply approaches an
v\ i ii rvi|uesN idcnlitu:atiuii.

Inn,/ the

tad lii.il an o niter identifies himself as a police officer does not convert a consensual
encounter into a seizure.""""" Carter, 812 P.2d at 463 (citations omitted); see also State v.
Jackson. 805 P,2d ?6* ^68 (Utah App. 1990) (as a matte.u.i

wall-. I. w i i i l .

M/ll l O H S l l l l l k

seizure)

d "".III

II! i t l l l l h

. :^\ - request for
**"

* III III I I III 1 I III III

2

"[Interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the
police does not, by itself,, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure

I Mess the

circumstances ot the eiitounlei die i.n iiiliiiiiiiliiliim as in nit iimnsli.ik illlial a IL'JSI umahle

1 he u:^.>; :,,u u) dcienudiit in support of his contention tl lat an unreasonable
seizure occurred are inapplicable because, in every cited case, the officers were clear!)
questioning the suspect for a criminal investigatory purpose. In this case, the officer was
not investigating a crime, but was attempting to document his activities after coming upon
the scene of a accident and stopping to render aid (R, 184 at 16-17).

7

person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot
say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment." I.N.S. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). In I.N.S. v. Delgado, immigration officials in search
of illegal aliens questioned factory workers about their identity and immigration status
while other agents were stationed at the factory exits. The court found that the
questioning of individual workers was brief and noncoercive, and ruled that no detention
or "reasonable threat of detention" occurred. Id. at 219. The court rejected the workers'
contention that, under the circumstances, the workers "reasonably feared that refusing to
answer would have resulted in their arrest." Id. at 220. As the court wrote, "it was
obvious from the beginning of the surveys that the INS agents were only questioning
people." Id. at 220. In this case, as in I.N.S., the officer's requests for defendant's name
were brief and would not have caused any reasonable person to believe that he or she
would be detained for failing to answer.
This Court has recognized certain factors tending to indicate a seizure has
occurred: (1) the threatening presence of several uniformed officers; (2) the display of a
weapon by an officer; (3) physical touching of the individual; or (4) the use of language
or voice tone threatening to the individual. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah
App. 1996); State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991). None of those factors
was present during Officer Ashley's requests for defendant's name. Although defendant
implies that the officer's requests for defendant's name escalated into a demand, the
8

evidence reflects simply that Ashley "just told him I needed his name so I could do the
report." Appellant's Brief at 13, R. 99. The trial court rejected any suggestion that the
officer's demeanor or tone of voice amounted to a show of authority, observing that the
officer's "voice is rather soft-spoken. His demeanor is not the least bit aggressive
[H]is physical stature is not imposing

Therefore, his mere request of the defendant

for a name, in and of itself, is not improper" (R. 184 at 17-18, Addendum A). See State
v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 1990) (no seizure where nothing in record
indicated officer acted in a way that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he or
she was compelled to produce identification, or that he or she could not freely walk
away).
Similarly without merit is defendant's contention that he was "directly confronted
by a uniformed, armed officer" whose vehicle's "emergency lights . . . were activated"
and that, under those circumstances, he "submitted to Deputy Ashley's show of
authority." Appellant's Brief at 15. The record does not reflect that Officer Ashley drew
his gun, or that defendant was intimidated by the officer's uniform. Furthermore, as the
trial court found, the officer's overhead lights were illuminated for a clear public safety
purpose; i.e., to divert traffic from the accident site (R.184 at 16, Addendum A). The trial
court correctly observed that under those circumstances it would be "absurd" to consider
use of the officer's overhead lights as a "seizure" (Id.).
"[T]he 'reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person." Florida v.

Bostick. 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (emphasis in original). Therefore, in determining
whether a reasonable person would have believed he was seized under the circumstances,
defendant's guilty state of mind and fear of being apprehended for previous criminal
activity are not relevant. No reasonable person in defendant's circumstances — i.e.,
standing in traffic next to a wrecked bicycle, having just been ejected from the bicycle's
seat ~ would regard an officer's use of his lights as a show of authority calculated to
effect a detention for criminal investigatory purposes. Indeed, a reasonable person in
defendant's circumstances would have been grateful for the officer's assistance, and
would have recognized that the officer's request for identity was legitimate for record
keeping purposes.
Here, the officer stopped to render assistance to defendant after a bicycle accident.
The officer noted scrapes on defendant's elbows, but defendant refused medical
assistance. The officer stated that he asked for defendant's name in order to file a report
of the accident. His purpose was to minimize any concerns of police liability that might
arise in the event that defendant had been injured more seriously than he acknowledged
himself to be (R. 101).3 His requests for defendant's name were directly related to the
purpose for his intervention, and did not amount to an unreasonable restraint on
defendant's liberty.

3

The record does not reflect whether defendant was wearing a bicycle helmet, but
it is self-evident that a bicyclist is vulnerable and exposed to injury in an accident.
10

As the trial court properly found:
We live in a society in which litigation is prevalent, both criminal and civil.
Officers can no longer expect that as they do their job there is not going to
be a need to later account for what is being done. Therefore, I'm sure it is
policy and practice to make a report of every episode that occurs, not just
criminal conduct but accidents such as this. So to make inquiry of this
individual who had obviously been in an accident of some sort and to ask
that person his name is not unreasonable, does not constitute any kind of
seizure or search or limitation of his freedom, nor is it improper.
(R. 184 at 16-17, Addendum A).
POINTII
THE OFFICER'S DETENTION OF DEFENDANT
DURING THE WARRANTS CHECK WAS
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION
In challenging the officer's detention of defendant during the warrants check,
defendant maintains that the trial court clearly erred in finding that M[t]he Deputy then
asked if the defendant had outstanding arrest warrants and the defendant responded that
he probably did" (R. 137, Addendum B). Appellant's Brief at 7-8. Defendant also claims
that the trial court erred in concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain
defendant while the officer ran a warrants check.
The constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones.
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1994). "To
determine whether a search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual
inquiry" (1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? and (2) Was the
11

resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place'?" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (quoting Jerry, 392 U.S. 1920).
A.

The Trial Court's Finding that Defendant Admitted that He "Probably"
Had an Outstanding Arrest Warrant was Supported by the Record.
The officer testified that defendant said that he "may" or "might" have an

outstanding warrant, or that he was "not sure" whether he had an outstanding warrant (R.
101, 194 at 7-8). That testimony, in defendant's view, was inadequate to support the trial
court's finding that defendant admitted to the officer that he "probably" had a warrant.
However, the officer also testified that "[h]e told me he probably had a warrant" and
affirmed that defendant "led [him] to believe that there may be one" (R. 101, 184 at 7).
The officer's testimony concerning defendant's reply, while varying in its exact
terminology, consistently reflected defendant's admission that it was likely that he had an
outstanding arrest warrant. Taken as a whole, the officer's testimony indicates that
defendant's response could be (and was) interpreted to mean that it was probable that
defendant had an outstanding warrant. Therefore, the trial court's finding accurately
reflected the substance of defendant's response.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Defendant's Reluctance to Give
His Name, Coupled with His Admission that He May Have Had an
Outstanding Warrant Provided Reasonable Suspicion Supporting His
Detention During the Warrants Check,
A detention must be based on articulable facts which, together with rational
12

inferences drawn from them, would lead a reasonable person to conclude defendant had
committed or was about to commit a crime. State v. Potter. 863 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App.
1993); State v. Svkes. 840 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah App. 1992). The articulable facts "must
be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by
those versed in the field of law enforcement... Thus, we review the basis for the
intrusion to determine whether the officer 'observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot."
State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted), cert, denied. 843
P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
"[A] warrants check is a useful and efficient weapon in the standard police arsenal
for dealing with suspicious persons." Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1007
(Utah App. 1996). An officer's conducting a warrants check during the course of a
traffic stop or other lawful detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it
does not significantly extend the period of detention. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,
452-53 (Utah 1995); State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994) (noting impact of
warrants check upon scope of detention is minimal due to efficiency of computerized data
storage while governmental interest in arresting citizens with outstanding warrants is
substantial).
In this case, as the trial court determined, defendant declined to give his name
under circumstances in which it would have been reasonable for him to do so (R. 184 at
13

18, 21, Addendum A). In addition, he responded equivocally to the officer's question
concerning whether he had an outstanding warrant. Defendant's admission that he
"might" have a warrant was an acknowledgment that he "might" be subject to arrest.
Taken in combination, defendant's hesitancy to reveal his name and his admission
that he "might" have a warrant were sufficient to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that defendant had been involved in criminal activity, or was otherwise subject to an order
of arrest. The most direct and expeditious means of determining whether the reasonable
suspicion was founded was to conduct a warrants check. Consequently, the officer's brief
detention of defendant during the warrants check was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendants' convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15^

day of.

1999.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
(2tSu2AjLA^j> AA . ( W A M J ^ V \ ^
CATHERINE M. JOHNS<
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

activity.

He stated that Mr. Kartchner had done

nothing wrong, that he had violated no traffic
ordinances .
And under those circumstances, the resulting
detention was unlawful.

And the fruit of that

unlawful detention must be suppressed.
THE COURT:

All right.

It will be the ruling

of the Court that the motion to suppress is denied.
This Court, first addressing the issue of the
activation of the takedown lights, finds that it is
absurd to consider that a seizure.

There are a

variety of reasons for activating lights, many of them
or even most of them having to do with public safety,
having to do with stopping traffic to insure safety.
The mere fact that somebody turns on their lights in a
patrol car in the process of rendering aid, which is
clearly what was contemplated here, is not any kind of
seizure.

And had Mr. Kartchner given his name, he not

had warrants or indicated the same, he would have been
free to go about his business.
We live in a society in which litigation is
prevalent, both criminal and civil.

Officers can no

longer expect that as they do their job there is not
going to be a need to later account for what is being
done.

Therefore, I'm sure it is policy and practice

16

to make a report of every episode
just criminal

that occurs, not

conduct but accidents

such as this.

to make inquiry of this individual who had
been in an accident

constitute

obviously

of some sort and to ask

person his name is not unreasonable,

that

does not

any kind of seizure or search or

of his freedom,

nor is it

their names are.

is precluded
Because

if we get

and do their

in time where

from asking

there is no ability of the police
our citizenry

limitation

improper.

I hope we never reach a point
law enforcement

citizens

to that

to help us protect

job.

only the testimony of Detective Ashley

and

demeanor
between

I note

for the record

large, imposing m a n .

is that of a gentle man
"gentle" and "man."

gentleman.
demeanor

that he
His

-- and 1 pause

soft-spoken.

is not the least bit aggressive.

is not in any way imposing

or impressive

ordinary,

stature

is not

There are certainly officers of whom
true.

this

He also is apparently a

His voice is rather

and his physical

not

the

totality of the facts and circumstances, but also

is not a particularly

what

point,

In this case I have taken into account,

morning his demeanor.

So

Therefore, his mere request

His

His voice
or out of the
imposing.

that would not be

of the

defendant
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for a name, in and of itself, is not improper.
It's this Court's finding that the
defendant's refusal to give that name -- while
certainly it may be within his rights to do so -coupled with his later indication that he might have a
warrant, instead of saying "certainly not" or some
other thing indicating the clear absence of a warrant,
creates a reasonable suspicion of improper conduct and
would allow for a short-term, minimal detention if
nothing else were revealed.

And that is precisely

what occurred.
We're not talking about any kind of major
intrusion into the defendant's freedom.
even cuffed at that point in time.

He was not

What we're talking

about is a mere request for the defendant to stay
there for a moment while a check was made.
Arguably it wasn't even a seizure at that
point in time.

But I think the better ruling is, it

was a limited seizure that was proper, both in terms
of the underlying motivation for the same, the basis
for the same, as well as the scope and the manner in
which it was handled.

There is nothing here to

suggest any impropriety in the police's conduct or
handling of this matter.

And for those reasons, I am

denying the Motion to Suppress.

18

And I will say further that I do not
consider this to be the same scenario as in Brown v.
Texas.

In that case obviously we had two people

walking down the street.
police to get involved.

There was no reason for the
There wasn't an accident;

there wasn't any kind of need to render assistance or
gather further data.

In this case it is

uncontroverted that there was an accident.

There was

a reason for a good police officer to get involved to
render assistance•
We seem to have reached a point in this
country in our present time where all police motives
are suspect.

And that is simply not the case.

And

where a police officer does one of the things that he
or she is supposed to do -- and that is, renders
assistance where someone appears to be clearly in
need -- this is not improper.

This is, in fact, what

we want of our police officers.
commenced in this scenario.

And that is what

And that makes it very

different than the Brown v. Texas case, and it's a
different scenario with the different result.
There is certainly a different basis for the
inquiry as to a name.

It's not just to harass.

It's

to be able to prepare a report in case of civil
litigation, and so that the officer can document his
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time, et cetera.

And for all of these reasons I have

ruled as I have.
I am going to ask, Mr. Kouris, that you
prepare findings consistent with but not limited to
what I have said, consistent with the testimony both
today from the officer and to the preliminary hearing,
referencing with specificity the facts.
clear:

And let me be

I am finding a detention -- if, in fact, there

was a detention, however limited it was -- did not
occur until and after the defendant had made the
statement about the possibility of an outstanding
warrant.
Now, you have had your hand up for about
five minutes, Mr. Dellapiana.

What would you like to

ask or to say?
MR. DELLAPIANA:

Judge, I just wanted a

clarification as to your finding on reasonable
suspicion.

The way you phrased it is, the refusal to

give the name coupled with the subsequent
about maybe having warrants constituted
suspicion.

comment

reasonable

Would you be willing to make a finding one

way or another as to refusing to give one's name, in
and of itself?
THE COURT:

No, I would not.

That's why I

said "coupled with," and apparently you heard that
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language.

The mere refusal to give the name -- and I

am absolutely certain I said this before, I will say
it again -- is not wrong.

I believe I said, and I

will say it again, every citizen has the right to
refuse to give their name.

But if, under

circumstances where there is no real reason not to
give your name, and if, in addition to that, someone
makes a statement that it is possible that they have a
warrant, those things together give rise to a
reasonable suspicion in my opinion.

And that's why I

said "coupled with,11 not standing alone.
I will add that it is very likely that the
statement about the possibility of the existence of a
warrant, standing alone, would probably be sufficient.
But we don't need to look at it as sufficient because
it is coupled with other conduct.
When viewed in the totality -- and that's
the important thing here.

All of the cases as we all

know on search and seizure are totality-of-thecircumstances cases.
exception.

And in this case there is no

It's the totality that I have considered:

The demeanor of the officer, the manner in which the
defendant came to his attention, the manner in which
the defendant comported himself from the moment that
the two came into contact with one another.
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Any other questions by way of
MR.

DELLAPIANA:

THE COURT:
Take some

from me/ your Honor.

Mr. Kartchner needs

to visit.

time.
MR.

your

Not

clarification?

DELLAPIANA:

Nothing

further

from us,

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Let me suggest

think we have a couple of remaining

issues.

that I

And

that

has to do, or those issues have to do with setting a
trial date and pressing
understanding

forward on this.

My

is we do not currently have a trial

date •
MR.

KOURIS:

THE COURT:
try

That's correct,

Judge.

When would you all be ready

to

this?
MR.

understanding

KOURIS:

Judge, it was the

State's

that this issue would be dispositive

the m a t t e r .

And whether

don't know.

That was the premise we looked

THE

Mr.
MR.

COURT:

All

of

that's still the case, I
at.

right.

Dellapiana?
DELLAPIANA:

If we could chat

for just a

second.
THE COURT:
gentlemen

Let's do this.

Why don't

take as much time as you want,

you

certainly

at
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
MARK S. KOURIS, 6594
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsCaseNo.971019499FS
SHANE KARTCHNER,
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence,filedon the above captioned matter, was
heard by this Court on June 4, 1998, at 8:30 A.M. Defendant was present and represented by
Ralph Dellapiana. The State of Utah was represented by Mark S. Kouris, Deputy District
Attorney. Testimony was taken by one witness and both parties briefed and argued the pertinent
issues. Being fully advised, the Court makes the following Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The State of Utah charged the defendant by Information of Unlawful Possession
of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Methamphetamine; and Unlawful Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia.

2.

The State based its Information on activities occurring on October 18, 1997 at 50
West 3900 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
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On that date. Sheriffs Deputy Michael A. Ashley traveled eastbound on 3900
South and noticed the defendant standing on the street at about 50 West.
For traffic management and the defendant's safety, Deputy Ashley activated his
overhead lights and exited his vehicle to assist the defendant.
The defendant explained that he had wrecked his bicycle on the road.
Despite scrape marks on the defendant's elbows, the defendant refused medical
assistance.
Based on the refusal of medical treatment, Deputy Ashley inquired as to the
defendant's name for completion of his accident report and the defendant refused
to provide it.
The Deputy then asked if the defendant had outstanding arrest warrants and the
defendant responded that he probably did.
At that time the Deputy directed the defendant to "wait" while he confirmed the
existence of warrants.
The Deputy confirmed outstanding warrants for the defendant and placed him
under arrest.
During a search incident to arrest, the Deputy found three small bags of an off
white powder, a syringe and a glass tube.
The defendant then admitted that the powder and paraphernalia belonged to him.
The defendant also admitted that he ingested the substance on two occasions
earlier that day.
Deputy Ashleyfield-testedthe powder and it tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The activation of the Deputy's vehicle's overhead lights did not constitute a
seizure as its stated and obvious purpose was to facilitate public safety.

Based on the defendant's refusal to give the Deputy his name, coupled with the
defendant's admission that he probably had outstanding arrest warrants, the
Deputy had reasonable suspicion to direct the defendant to wait while he checked
for the existence of warrants.

DATED this

n^day of _

./

z -*-'- ' , 1998.

BYTHE^OtJRT:
-7^LESLIE A. LEWIS, Judge
Approved as to form:

Ralph Dellapiana
Attorney for the Defendant
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
MARX S. KOURIS, 6594
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

-vsCaseNo.971019499FS
SHANE KARTCHNER,
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law based thereon:
The Court hereby orders that defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied.
DATED this

L

'"'"day of

;

'

• , :

1998.

BY THE COURT:
//

Sul/Ut

-jy^M

LESLIE A. LEWIS, Judge
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